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This paper argues that the hype around ‘ethics’ as panacea for remedying algorithmic discrimination 
is a smokescreen for carrying on with business as usual. First, it analyses how the current discourses 
around digital innovation and algorithmic technologies (including artificial intelligence or AI), newly 
emerging technology policy and governmental funding patterns as well as global industry develop-
ments are currently re-configured around ‘ethical’ considerations. Here, the paper shows how this 
phenomenon can be broken down into policy approaches and technological approaches. Second, it 
sets out to provide three pillars for a sociological framework that can help reconceptualize the algo-
rithmic harm and discrimination as an issue of social inequality, rather than ethics. Here, it builds on 
works on data classification, human agency in design and intersectional inequality. To conclude, the 
paper suggests three pragmatic steps that should be taken in order to center social justice in technol-
ogy policy and computer science education. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
This paper provocatively argues that the hype 
around ‘ethics’ as panacea for offsetting dis-
crimination in and through algorithmic technol-
ogies1 is a smokescreen for carrying on with 
business as usual. It suggests that ‘ethics’ is 
largely deployed to gain competitive advantage 
(between firms, industries, nations) rather than 
initiating a genuine push towards social justice. 
The paper builds this argument in three steps: 
First, it analyses how the current discourse 
around algorithm innovation is re-configured 
around ‘ethical’ considerations. As part of that, 
it delves into current computer science scholar-
ship on ‘moral machines’ and puts this into con-
text with the latest works on technology and dis-
crimination. Second, it provides a sociological 
framework for conceptualizing the harm and 
discrimination that can be caused by digital 
technologies as an issue of social inequality, ra-
ther than ethics. Here, it builds on sociological 
approaches to notions of ‘the social’ in data clas-
sification, human agency in networks of design 
and intersectional inequality. Based on that it, 
third, suggests three points that must inform new 
technology policy and computer science peda-
gogy in order to center digital innovation on so-
cial justice. 
2 ALGORITHMIC HARM: 
ETHICS TO THE RESCUE? 
Over the past years, we have seen more and 
more evidence that algorithmic technologies can 
disproportionately disadvantage and/or harm so-
cial groups that are already negatively affected 
                                               
1 In this paper, the term ‘algorithmic technologies’ refers 
broadly to any digital technology that is put to work based 
on an algorithm (including machine learning technolo-
gies), whereby an algorithm is a ‘computational procedure 
for deriving a result, much like a recipe is a procedure for 
making a particular dish’ (Broussard 2018, p. 20). Fur-
thermore, the term ‘algorithmic technologies’, here, in-
cludes automated decision-making systems, commonly 
referred to as ‘artificial intelligence’ or ‘AI’. 
by social segregation and oppression (Bolukbasi 
et al 2016; Buolamwini and Gebru 2018; Eu-
banks 2018; Noble 2018; O’Neil 2016). In re-
sponse, many technologists and policy makers 
set out to remedy this situation by way of ‘eth-
ics’.  
The issues of algorithmic discrimination and 
harm are increasingly addressed through empha-
sizing the need for ‘ethics’ in algorithmic tech-
nologies. While there is a substantial body of 
work that has long argued that technical artifacts 
do have politics (see famously Winner 1980) 
and thus do contain, in one form or another, val-
ues (see for example Nissenbaum 2010), the 
idea of ethics in algorithmic technology has re-
cently taken particular shapes: ‘ethical AI’ has 
not only been announced as a ‘top technology 
trend for 2019’ (Lomas 2018), but is also being 
positioned as a key element in the global race for 
technology leadership, informing heavily 
funded university initiatives (such as MIT’s $1 
billion investment into the Stephen A. Schwarz-
man College of Computing which will have an 
explicit focus on ‘ethical considerations relevant 
to computing and AI’ [MIT News 2018]) as well 
as government and industry investments (Dutton 
2018, Sloane 2018). 
In practice, the recent rise of ‘ethics’ in the con-
text of algorithmic technologies has informed 
two types of (often overlapping) approaches to 
mitigating algorithmic harm: ethics as a policy 
approach2 and ethics as a technology approach. 
The policy approach often materializes as a form 
of self-regulation, for example through ethics 
codes, frameworks and principles that set out to 
define sets of rules and values to help guide a 
‘responsible’ development of AI technology3. 
2 Due to the limited scope of this paper, the policy ap-
proach, here, does exclude legislative frameworks that 
regulate issues adjacent to algorithmic technology, such 
as data (e.g. the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation 
[GDPR]).  
3 Prominent examples include Google’s ‘Objectives for 
AI Applications’  (Pichai 2018), the newly updated ‘Code 
of Ethics and Professional Conduct’ by the Association of 
Computing Machinery (ACM 2018) or the Institute of 
But it may also take the form of external ‘ethics 
boards’4, fairness and ethics trainings for com-
puter science students and professionals (Fiesler 
2018; Vallor 2018) or the suggestion of algo-
rithm designers and engineers swearing a ‘Hip-
pocratic Oath’ (Etzioni 2018). 
While the policy approach targets the human 
lead within algorithm design, the technology ap-
proach sets out to create what we may call 
‘moral machines’ (Wallach and Allen 2009). 
The notion of ‘ethics’ that informs these efforts 
tends to be grounded in the tradition of moral 
philosophy. Without wanting to  crudely sim-
plify the vast scholarly tradition of moral philos-
ophy dating back to Kant’s categorical impera-
tive, we may describe moral philosophy as a the-
ory that is fundamentally concerned with what 
counts as a good life as basis for making a deci-
sion (Vallor 2016). The overarching goal of cre-
ating ‘moral machines’ is to work ethics, moral-
ity and values into the machines themselves 
(Anderson and Leigh Anderson 2011; Yu et al 
2018). This consideration has become more ur-
gent in the context of the increased complexity 
and computational capability of algorithmic 
technologies that are deployed as autonomous 
agents (or as ‘AI’). The common rationale is that 
these agents now require a ‘capacity for moral 
decision making’ (Moniz Pereira and Saptawi-
jaya 2016) when working towards achieving 
goals5. Related considerations and new strate-
gies are emerging in the context of ‘fairness’ 
                                               
Electrical and Electronics Engineers’ (IEEE) framework 
for ‘Ethically Aligned Design’ (IEEE 2018).  
4 See, for example, the Axon AI and Policing Technology 
Ethics Board (Axon 2019), or Google’s newly appointed 
Advanced Technology External Advisory Council 
(Walker 2019). 
5 See especially Noothigattu et al (2018) for insight into 
how autonomous agents may balance ‘moral values’ and 
‘game rewards’ in the context of value-alignment.  
6 A substantial part of the discourse around ‘fairness’ in 
machine learning (and especially prediction-based deci-
sion-making systems) focuses on the question whether 
and how inequality patterns that inevitably emerge 
through data sets can be mitigated algorithmically (see es-
pecially the proceedings of the 2019 ACM Conference on 
Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency [ACM 
enhancement and ‘bias’ mitigation in algorith-
mic technologies6.  
3 INEQUALITY IS THE NAME OF 
THE GAME 
Unsurprisingly, the way in which ‘ethics’ is cur-
rently enacted and deployed is increasingly crit-
icized. A key critique is the fact that neither the 
policy approach, nor the technological approach 
to ‘ethics’ is grounded in a legal framework – 
‘ethics’ is simply not enforceable by law (Chad-
wick 2018) and ultimately remains a gesture of 
goodwill of those who create algorithmic tech-
nologies. The overwhelming – and voluntary – 
commitment to ‘ethics’ by companies selling al-
gorithmic technologies can, therefore, be seen as 
a form of ‘whitewashing’ (Wagner 2018). Addi-
tionally, there is new evidence indicating that 
ethical frameworks simply do not affect the de-
cision making of technologists (McNamara, 
Smith and Murphy-Hill 2018). And as Greene, 
Hoffman and Stark (2018) show, ‘ethics’ tend to 
position algorithmic harm as a social problem 
that requires a technical solution. That the social 
problem is deeply entangled with the existing 
fault lines of social stratification falls somewhat 
outside of the ontology of ‘ethical algorithms’. 
Therefore, relying on ‘ethics’, whether through 
policy or technical approaches, implies that the 
mechanics retaining the status quo remain un-
touched. In other words, the notion of ‘ethics’ 
does not require us to examine the historic, 
FAT*], as well as Mitchell, Portash and Barocas 2018). 
Here, however, many fairness-in-machine learning schol-
ars are careful not to suggest that the data that is used to 
train algorithmic systems and that describes the social 
world can be somewhat independent of the (unequal) 
structures that make up that social world (see especially 
Barocas, Hardt and Narayanan 2018). Sebastian Benthall 
and Bruce D. Haynes (2018) go further to argue that the 
social categories that are routinely used to classify social 
data are complicit in anchoring mechanisms of inequality 
and oppression. They take the case of racial categories in 
machine learning to illustrate this argument. Here, they 
suggest using unsupervised machine learning to dynami-
cally detect patterns of segregation prior to group fairness 
interventions with the goal of preventing the perpetuation 
of racial categories as status categories of disadvantage. 
systematic and complex inequalities that cause 
algorithmic bias and violence – even when we 
return to the fundamentals of moral philosophy: 
asking whether something is ‘done ethically’ 
does not question who defines and enforces what 
a good life is, and for whom, and from what po-
sition of power, or not, that decision is being 
made. That is to say that ‘ethics’ does not 
prompt us to reflect on and intervene in the so-
cial organization of algorithm design at large 
and the cultures and power relations that under-
pin it.  
To illustrate this point, let us put it into the con-
text of the current tech landscape: I would argue 
that there is a link between the fact that Alphabet 
Inc.’s search algorithm (‘Google’) tends to show 
white, male individuals in searches for the term 
‘CEO’ (Sottek 2015), that Alphabet Inc. paid out 
a $90 Million exit package to a senior executive 
who had a track record in sexually harassing co-
workers and that very recently 20,000 Google 
employees walked out of their offices in protest 
of this incident, and a misogynist work culture 
at large (Wakabayashi and Benner 2018). The 
link between these events is social, historical 
and cultural and it points to the ways in which 
different kinds of inequality manifest across all 
domains of social life, including technology de-
sign and the technology industry at large. And 
there is a growing body of work that supports 
this claim: Meredith Broussard (2018) has re-
cently argued that the sexism and ‘bro-culture’ 
that is rampant in the tech industry is deeply en-
tangled with the history of computing and math-
ematics in general while Marie Hicks (2017) has 
demonstrated how gendered inequalities in com-
putation are not accidental, but derive from a 
particular cultural landscape and a series of pol-
icy decisions. Safiya Umoja Noble (2018) sem-
inal study of search algorithms has revealed how 
capital, gender and race are central to the tech-
nological formation of social oppression. What 
cuts across these studies is one message: ine-
quality, as a complex, historical and emergent 
phenomenon, is ‘the name of the game’. And a 
narrow focus on ‘ethics’ through policy and 
technological approaches prevent us from exam-
ining the rules of this game from a critical point 
of view.  
4 RECONFIGURING THE 
CONVERSATION 
Clearly then, reclaiming this critical point of 
view requires a framework for conceptualizing 
the harm and discrimination that can be caused 
through algorithmic technologies as an issue of 
social inequality, rather than ‘ethics’. This 
framework must narrow in on what we mean by 
‘inequality’ in the context of algorithmic tech-
nology. It must also enable a critical observation 
of the contingencies of social life and the histor-
ical and cultural make-up of the contexts in 
which algorithmic technologies emerge. Here, it 
is useful to turn to the social sciences who have 
long dealt with these kinds of issues. I therefore 
propose to build on social and cultural theory 
and consider the following three aspects (which 
are not separate, but overlap) as part of pursuing 
more socially just technology design:  
‘The social’ in data – As a basis for understand-
ing inequality in algorithmic technology design, 
we must ask broader questions around how dif-
ferent notions of ‘the social’ get classified (see 
also Bowker and Leigh Star 1999) and embed-
ded into the datasets that form the basis for al-
gorithmic technology. Data selection and data 
classification are a way of world-making, they 
are based on humans making judgements about 
other things, social environments, other humans 
and so on.  This world-making through the col-
lection of data is not neutral, but steeped in his-
tory, culture, personal experience, social posi-
tion and so on. This is where algorithmic ine-
quality materializes as a continuation of existing 
social stratification and oppression. As judge-
ments turn into data labels and data sets, they are 
decontextualized, so the backstory to their emer-
gence is not carried over into the system. The is-
sue of abstraction (see also Selbst et al 2018), of 
course, is one of the eternal tensions between 
quantitative and qualitative traditions of 
knowing and describing the world. But as algo-
rithmic technology takes on a constitutive role 
in the mediation of social life, the implications 
of abstractions scale up significantly. Ethics 
frameworks and moral machines do not put a 
question mark behind the way in which data be-
comes a social object and enshrines the status 
quo.  
Human agency in technology design – Even 
though the current rhetoric cultivates the notion 
that algorithmic systems (especially ‘AI’) are 
capable of developing their own agency, it is 
clear that we are far away from systems that re-
semble a general artificial intelligence (Knight 
and Hao 2019). But it is a reality that algorithms 
are increasingly entrusted with making deci-
sions about humans (Whittaker et al 2018). This 
means that we need a conceptual handle for as-
sessing this new area of tension. That non-hu-
man actors play a constitutive role in society has 
long been established by schools of thought such 
as Science and Technology Studies (STS) and 
Actor-Network Theory (ANT). They are there-
fore useful for getting our heads around the re-
lationship that evolves between humans and 
(computational) machines. Put broadly, STS and 
ANT promote an ontology whereby agency 
emerges in a network between human and non-
human actors (Latour 2005). But the rise of al-
gorithmic technology, paradoxically, makes a 
good case for human agency taking the lead in 
the formation of this assemblage: humans deter-
mine who becomes an algorithm designer, how 
the system is designed, how the data is selected 
and optimization targets (implicitly or explic-
itly) are set, and so on. And yet, the materiality 
of computational systems (from the increasingly 
powerful hardware to the ‘neural network’ struc-
tures enabling ‘deep learning’) plays a central 
                                               
7 Hennion (2016) positions pragmatism as a critique of 
ANT, starting from the issue that ANT’s focus on object-
people relation comes at the cost of diluting agency in a 
network between human and non-human actors. For him, 
pragmatism means “‘socializing’ objects, but not by emp-
tying out their content” (Hennion, 2016, p. 299) 
8 Forlano (2017) critically analyses emergent design prac-
tices and perspectives against the backdrop of key works 
role in the rise of algorithmic technologies. This 
means that in order to better understand the un-
folding of agency (and politics) in algorithmic 
technology design, deployment and integration, 
we need a productive critique of STS and ANT. 
While ‘ethics’ are not a good vehicle for that, 
newer debates emerging adjacent to STS/ANT 
become central, particularly Antoine Hennion’s 
(2016)7 notion of pragmatism and Laura For-
lano’s (2017)8 work on design in the context of 
nonhuman, the posthuman and the more than hu-
man.  
Intersectional inequality – The use of ‘ethics’ in 
much of the current landscape of algorithmic 
technology does not only circumnavigate the 
concept of social inequality at large, but inter-
sectional inequality specifically. Kimberlé 
Crenshaw’s (1991) original notion of ‘intersec-
tionality’ shows how categories of inequality, 
such as race, class and gender, intersect and are 
experienced. Crenshaw’s study outlined how 
women of color were disproportionately af-
fected by hiring discrimination and how neither 
the category of race, nor the category of gender 
fully captured their experience and could be lev-
eraged in an anti-discrimination suit in court. Pa-
tricia Hill Collins (2000) developed the notion 
of intersectionality outside of the legal domain 
and proposed it as a general form of analysis 
‘claiming that systems of race, social class, gen-
der, sexuality, ethnicity, nation, and age form 
mutually constructing features of social organi-
zation’ (Collins 2000, p. 299). As a framework, 
intersectionality ‘provides a complex under-
standing of inequality that takes multiple 
sources of disadvantage as the source and solu-
tion for inequality’ (Hurtado 2018). Taking in-
tersectional inequality seriously in the context of 
algorithmic technology means putting the lived 
on the nonhuman, the posthuman and the more than hu-
man to suggest that it is important to acknowledge that 
posthumanism may not serve those communities who 
have traditionally been excluded from humanism in the 
first place, such as women, people of color, the LGTBQ 
community, and others.   
experience of those affected by (algorithmic) 
discrimination front and centre in discussions 
around technology and social justice.  
The notion of intersectional inequality is already 
informing new and important research in the 
context of algorithmic technology and design. 
Most notably, Sasha Costanza-Chock (2018) 
has built on the notion of intersectionality to 
show how design – as a socio-technical system 
at large – reproduces and is reproduced by a 
‘matrix of domination’ in which gender, class 
and race serve as interlocking systems of op-
pression to formulate ‘design justice principles’ 
that can help break design’s complicity with op-
pression. Relatedly, Joy Buolamwini and Timnit 
Gebru (2018) have taken intersectionality as a 
cue to use the Fitzpatrick skin type scale as a ba-
sis for a phenotypic evaluation of face-based 
gender classification accuracy in automated fa-
cial analysis. Schlesinger, Edwards and Grinter 
(2017) have built on the intersectionality lens in 
order to show how human-computer interaction 
(HCI) research can be comprised of clearer re-
porting of context to foster a deeper engagement 
with identity complexities.  
These are all important advancements. But to 
help address the social problem of inequality at 
large, beyond the technological and ethical 
realm and as a broad research and policy goal, 
they need to by synthesized into a holistic frame-
work that can help examine data categorization, 
materiality and agency, as suggested above. 
5 MOVING FORWARD 
On a pragmatic level, we must then take the fol-
lowing steps to foster a more focused consider-
ation of inequality in technology practice and 
policy as well as computer science pedagogy:  
(1) We must bring questions of data epistemol-
ogy onto the top of the agenda, because knowing 
how data comes to describe and organize the so-
cial is key for understanding and mitigating 
                                               
9 This is particularly salient in the context of the co-called 
‘black box problem’, whereby it is unclear to the human 
actor how the algorithm reached its conclusion/prediction.  
algorithmic harm9 and social inequality more 
broadly. Here, we may have to flip the script and 
focus on data classification as emerging from 
the lived experience of social actors, rather than 
as based on external evaluation and categoriza-
tion. This acknowledges that data describing the 
social world can never be independent from the 
categories and hierarchies that organize that 
world. I can also put intersectional inequality at 
the heart of efforts to make algorithmic technol-
ogies socially just and prompt new political dis-
cussions about inequality beyond the technical 
realm. 
(2) We need better collaborations between quan-
titative and qualitative scholarship, especially in 
the context of computer science pedagogy. 
Computer science students must be equipped 
with the conceptual tools they need to reflex-
ively locate themselves, and their practice, in the 
social world. By the same token, we need social 
science and humanities scholars who are able to 
actively engage in data and computer science 
practice.  
(3) We need a clearer picture of the terms that 
are at stake and currently do important political 
work, because the unclarity about key terms 
(such as ‘algorithm’, ‘digitization’, ‘machine 
learning’ and so on, but also ‘fairness’, ‘bias’, 
‘standardization’, ‘accountability’) impacts our 
ability to have more productive conversations 
about the abilities and limits of new technolo-
gies, and explore regulatory possibilities. 
These considerations, together with a frame-
work that allows us to explore questions in the 
context of data classification, human agency and 
intersectional inequality in algorithm design, 
will allow us to reclaim digitization as a posi-
tive, rather than threatening, new way of know-
ing social life (see also Marres 2017). This will 
open up new possibilities for addressing the is-
sue of social inequality at large, beyond the dig-
ital space.  
6 CONCLUSION 
This paper has argued that the current focus on 
and enactment of ‘ethics’ will not facilitate so-
cial justice in algorithmic technology. To do so, 
it has mapped out how ethics – as policy ap-
proach and ethics as technological approach – 
fails to solve the root problem of algorithmic 
discrimination. To illustrate this point, the paper 
has built on recent developments in the tech in-
dustry and argued that the historic continuation 
of certain cultures, power structures and ways of 
socially organizing algorithm design require a 
conceptual handle that reconfigures algorithmic 
discrimination as an issue of social inequality, 
rather than ethics. Here, it has suggested to com-
bine sociological approaches to notions of ‘the 
social’ in data classification, human agency in 
networks of design and intersectional inequality. 
To conclude, the paper has taken this framework 
as a cue to suggest three pragmatic steps that 
must be taken in order to move forward in tech-
nology policy and computer science education: 
(1) focusing on data epistemology as emergent 
from lived experience, (2) better dialogue be-
tween quantitative and qualitative scholarships, 
(especially in the context of computer science 
pedagogy), and (3) more clarity about key terms 
that are currently at stake in the discourse around 
digitization, algorithmic technology and ine-
quality. 
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